German rearmament and the AfD rise have created an unsettling strategic dilemma for Poland. Warsaw wants Europe’s largest economy to possess the military strength needed to deter Russia, defend NATO territory and support Ukraine. Yet the reported electoral surge of the far-right Alternative for Germany has revived an equally powerful concern: weapons remain reassuring only while democratic, pro-European institutions control them.
That tension sharpened after the Alternative for Germany reportedly secured 43.8 percent in the Saxony-Anhalt election, while Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democratic Union fell to 17.2 percent. The result described in the report is politically significant, but official election data and final certification should always be consulted when assessing its precise implications.
Why German Rearmament and the AfD Rise Trouble Poland
Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski captured Warsaw’s dilemma with unusual bluntness. Poland supports a strong Germany under democratic leadership, he argued, but fears what could happen if a heavily armed state were eventually led by a far-right, Russia-friendly party. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk was similarly severe, condemning Polish enthusiasm for the AfD’s success.
These warnings are not simply emotional reactions to a difficult past. They connect historical memory with a contemporary question of democratic control. Poland endured the 1939 invasion of Poland, followed by occupation, mass murder and devastation during World War II. Although modern Germany is a democratic republic embedded in European and transatlantic institutions, Polish security thinking remains acutely sensitive to shifts in German power and political identity.
The central issue is not whether Germany should be capable of defending Europe, but whether its military power will remain anchored to democratic oversight, NATO solidarity and resistance to Russian coercion.
Germany’s Military Expansion Changes Europe’s Balance
Merz has pledged to transform the Bundeswehr into Europe’s strongest conventional military. The report places German annual military spending at $114 billion and describes plans for almost €12 billion in long-range weapons. Such capabilities could strengthen deterrence by allowing Germany to strike military targets far behind an aggressor’s front line.
This expansion responds to the strategic rupture caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. European governments can no longer assume that modest forces, limited ammunition reserves and reliance on the United States will be sufficient. NATO’s published defence expenditure information offers the appropriate official context for comparing national commitments.
Deterrence and Political Risk
A stronger German army offers clear benefits. It can reinforce NATO’s eastern flank, improve air and missile defence, expand ammunition production and reduce pressure on American forces. For Poland, which has also invested heavily in defence, capable German units could become indispensable partners in protecting the Baltic region.
The risk lies in future policy direction. The AfD’s parliamentary group has opposed German weapons deliveries to Ukraine and advocated easing sanctions on Moscow during negotiations. If such positions shaped federal policy, expensive German capabilities might be withheld from allied missions, used to pressure neighbours politically or detached from a common European strategy. That prospect explains why Poland’s concerns about German military expansion focus on political command rather than hardware alone.
Can the AfD Control Germany’s Military?
At present, the AfD remains outside Germany’s federal government. Mainstream parties maintain a political
Frequently Asked Questions
Does a strong AfD result in Saxony-Anhalt give the party control over Germany’s armed forces?
No. A state election does not determine Germany’s federal government or transfer authority over the Bundeswehr. Military policy is set through federal institutions, including the chancellor, cabinet and Bundestag. However, a major regional result can increase the AfD’s national influence, normalize its positions and signal stronger prospects in future federal elections.
What safeguards could prevent a future German government from misusing military power?
Germany’s Basic Law places the Bundeswehr under civilian authority and requires parliamentary approval for most overseas deployments. Courts, coalition politics, federal institutions and public scrutiny provide additional checks. NATO and EU commitments also raise the political cost of unilateral action, although they cannot guarantee that every future government will maintain the same strategic priorities.
Why does Poland support German rearmament if it considers it a potential risk?
Poland faces an immediate security threat from Russia and needs capable allies able to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank. German forces can provide air defence, logistics, ammunition and conventional deterrence. Warsaw’s concern is therefore conditional: greater German capability is welcome while it remains tied to democratic oversight, support for Ukraine and credible commitments to collective European defence.
Could an AfD-led government simply withdraw German forces from NATO missions?
A German government could seek to reduce participation in allied operations, restrict weapons deliveries or adopt a more accommodating policy toward Moscow. Such changes would still face parliamentary, legal, coalition and diplomatic constraints. NATO membership does not automatically force every country to contribute specific forces, so political reluctance in Berlin could weaken deterrence even without a formal withdrawal.
Do Germany’s planned long-range weapons threaten Poland directly?
Under current policy, these systems are intended to strengthen NATO deterrence by holding an aggressor’s military infrastructure at risk from greater distances. Poland benefits when such capabilities support shared defence plans. The anxiety concerns who may control them in the future, not an announced German plan to target Poland or other European allies.
How should readers assess the reported AfD election figures cited in the article?
They should distinguish preliminary reporting, projections and certified results. Official data from the relevant state election authority should be checked for final vote shares, turnout, seat distribution and any recounts. Even a striking regional result should not automatically be treated as evidence that the AfD has equivalent support nationwide or can form a federal government.